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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A.   Historical Origin 
 Papal courts gained popularity in the Middle Ages as a major 
source of the Roman Church’s power and wealth; and the Pope, as 
the head of the papal court, often decided cases in collaboration with 
a king, a duke, or an archbishop.1 Ironically, early concerns over the 
papal court centered on the Pope’s entanglement in the secular and 
political life of Europe. “[T]o think chiefly in legal, was to think 
chiefly in secular, terms,”2 a practice ill-suited to Peter’s successors. 
Increasingly, the Popes of the Middle Ages acted like kings and be-
came entrenched in diplomatic, international relations. Efforts to re-
form the Church by improving ethical standards and “disengaging 
the clergy from their role as supporters of the State, ended, by a kind 
of helpless logic, in thrusting the Church far more deeply and com-
pletely into the secular world [and] . . . the Church became a secular 
                                                                                                                    
 * B.A. Haverford College, 1994; J.D. Florida State University, expected May 2003.  
Thank you to Professor Vinson and Bill, who managed to dredge through the “legaldegooky 
garbage” to offer valuable comments; to my friends and family, for their encouragement 
and faith; and to Steve, whose love makes roller coasters worth riding. 
 1. See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 207 (1976). 
 2. Id. 
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world of its own.”3 Like many of the rival kingdoms in Europe, the 
Church and the State were bound for war. 
 The personal and political conflict between Thomas Becket (1118-
1170) and King Henry II (1154-1189), one of the most competent of 
English kings, demonstrates early tensions between conflicting au-
thorities. In the early years of King Henry II’s reign, lawlessness ran 
rampant among members of the clergy; but clergymen were tried in 
the less severe legal system of the Church.4 Hoping to rid his king-
dom of this double standard, King Henry looked to his friend Thomas 
Becket, who had served England as a “seemingly complaisant chan-
cellor.”5 
 On June 2, 1162, King Henry secured the election of Becket as 
archbishop of Canterbury.6 Henry hoped that he and Becket might 
end the conflict created by the existence of two legal systems.7 But as 
archbishop, Becket found in God a higher authority than the king.8 
When a Worcestershire cleric raped a young girl and murdered her 
father: 
Becket had [him] branded. This was open to four objections: it was 
inadequate; it was a sentence unknown to canon law; it was, in-
deed, a usurpation of royal authority; and it flatly contradicted 
Becket’s own argument that clerks should not suffer mutilation, 
normal in royal courts, ‘lest in man the image of God be de-
formed.’9 
 King Henry responded by enacting the Constitutions of Claren-
don, which limited the power of the Church in a number of ways, in-
cluding the subjection of clergy to civil courts and the weakening of 
the Church’s power of excommunication.10 As a servant to God, no 
longer to the king, Becket resisted these changes. Tensions grew be-
tween Church and State, and King Henry, temporarily enraged, 
called for Becket’s death.11 Norman knights carried out the King’s re-
quest, and “Henry was forced to abandon the Constitutions of Clar-
endon and to do public penance at Becket’s grave.”12 Despite the ap-
parent victory for the Church, the King of England, rather unevent-
fully, continued his control over ecclesiastical affairs.13 
                                                                                                                    
 3. Id. 
 4. See id. at 208 (“Perhaps one in fifty people could make some claim to be consid-
ered in orders. And of these about one in six could expect to get into trouble with the law.”). 
 5. WILLISON WALKER ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 367 (1985). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 207. 
 8. See id. at 209. 
 9. Id. 
 10. WALKER ET AL., supra note 5, at 367. 
 11. See id. at 368. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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B.   Current Crisis 
 Church and State have collided once again; and once again, the 
Church has been entirely too forgiving under the legal standards of 
the State. In June 2001, Cardinal Bernard F. Law admitted that in 
1984 he appointed Reverend John J. Geoghan parochial vicar of a 
suburban parish two months after learning that Geoghan allegedly 
molested seven boys.14 Law’s admission prompted investigative re-
ports—reminiscent of Woodward and Bernstein’s uncovering of Wa-
tergate—by editor Walter V. Robinson and reporters Matt Carroll, 
Sacha Pfeiffer, and Michael Rezendes of The Boston Globe’s “Spot-
light Team.”15 The Spotlight Team gained access to confidential docu-
ments and discovered written proof that the archdiocese had known 
about Geoghan’s abuse of children for decades.16 In over 300 newspa-
per articles on clergy sexual abuse, the Globe reported that cardinals 
and “bishops had known about [numerous incidents of] abuse [by 
members of the clergy] but failed to remove the priests from their 
jobs . . . [and] that over the past decade the Archdiocese of Boston 
had secretly settled cases in which at least seventy priests had been 
accused of sexual abuse.”17 But the problem was much larger than 
events in Boston. From January to April 2002, 176 priests across the 
country were removed from their positions, and bishops in the 
United States, Poland, and Ireland resigned.18 
 Reports of abuse and of the Church’s failure to protect minors led 
infuriated Catholics to withhold contributions to the Church and de-
mand reform.19 Some state legislators amended mandatory reporting 
laws to include clergy among the list of mandatory reporters, and 
                                                                                                                    
 14. THE INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH, at ix (2002). 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. For a full text of Cardinal Law’s June 5th and June 7th depositions, detailing 
the Cardinal’s appointment of known pedophiles to positions within the Church, see Pam 
Belluck, Cardinal Told How His Policy Shielded Priests, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/14/national/14CARD.html (last visited Jan. 7, 
2003) (on file with author); see also Fred Bayles, Abuse Victims Flock to Lawyers, USA 
TODAY, July 30, 2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2002-07-30-
abuse-litigate_x.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (“Attorneys who defend the church say the 
swift, quiet settlements of the past are now impossible with the flood of cases and news re-
ports of church coverups.”); Margaret Cronin Fisk, Church’s New Trial, NAT’L L.J., May 10, 
2002, available at http://www.law.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2002) (explaining that previ-
ously settled claims are resurfacing in litigation where it is alleged that settlements were 
fraudulently induced, “the church failed to live up to agreements to remove the priests 
from the active ministry,” or the Church falsely “testified that there were no other vic-
tims”). 
 18. THE INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 14, at 4. 
 19. Id. 
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prosecutors began issuing arrest warrants for priests.20 Cardinals of 
the United States and the leadership of the United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops (the “USCCB”) traveled to the Vatican in April 
for a meeting with the Prefects of the Roman Congregations, where 
Pope John Paul II issued a statement recognizing that the sexual 
abuse of minors “is by every standard wrong and rightly considered a 
crime by society [and that] it is also an appalling sin in the eyes of 
God.”21 As a result of this meeting, on June 14, 2002, the USCCB 
adopted its first national policy on dealing with sexual abuse.22 
 The Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People 
states that “[t]here is no place in the priesthood or religious life for 
those who would harm the young.”23 But this statement comes more 
than a decade too late, and the Church is now called to defend itself 
against hundreds of lawsuits in which church victims are filing tort 
claims ranging from breach of fiduciary duty to negligent hiring, su-
pervision, and retention. To fight this war, the Church has replaced 
its once-trusted weapon of excommunication with a more modern 
shield: the First Amendment. Behind this shield, battles are being 
won and lost. 
 In examining third party tort actions against the Church, Part II 
next surveys the causes of action asserted to hold a religious organi-
zation liable for the sexual misconduct of a member of its clergy.24 
                                                                                                                    
 20. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (2002).  For further discussion, see infra 
Part V of this Article. 
 21. Pope John Paul II, Address to the Cardinals of the United States and Conference 
Officers (Apr. 23, 2002), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/ 
speeches/2002/april/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20020423_usa-cardinals_en.html (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2003). 
 22. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Essential Norms for Dioce-
san/Eparchial Policies Dealing with Allegations of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Priests, Dea-
cons, or Other Church Personnel (June 14, 2002), available at http://www.usccb.org/bish-
ops/norms (last visited Nov. 25, 2002). 
 23. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHARTER FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN & YOUNG PEOPLE art. 5 (2002) (setting procedures for investi-
gating alleged abuse cases and mandating the immediate removal of any cleric who has 
sexually abused a young person). 
 24. For purposes of this Comment, “clergy” or “cleric” may refer to an ordained or li-
censed priest, rabbi, or minister of any religious organization or denomination, but it does 
not include lay persons who are employed by the religious organization. Unless otherwise 
stated, the term “Church” is used loosely throughout this Comment and refers to any reli-
gious organization or denomination. While the Roman Catholic Church is the subject of re-
cent controversy and is a named defendant in many of the cases discussed in this Com-
ment, no religious organization is immune from the potential for sexual misconduct. See, 
e.g., Alan Cooperman, Sexual Abuse Scandal Hits Orthodox Jews, WASH. POST, June 29, 
2002, at A2 (Jewish synagogues have not faced “anything like the tidal wave of criminal 
charges and civil lawsuits, involving hundreds of priests, that have hit the Catholic 
Church” because, unlike priests, “rabbis are hired and fired by the boards of directors of 
individual synagogues.  ‘An offender could conceivably be dismissed by one congregation 
and get a job in another one, but there is no superior rabbi in a position to shift an offender 
from here to there.’”); Michael Paulson, All Faiths Question Handling of Abuse: Debate 
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Part III focuses on the viability of one of those causes of action—
negligent hiring, supervision and retention—under First Amendment 
analysis. Part IV discusses the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Malicki v. Doe and Doe v. Evans, where the court held that the First 
Amendment did not bar a claim against a religious institution, at 
least at the initial pleading stage, for harm caused by the sexual mis-
conduct of a cleric.25 Finally, this Comment identifies common issues 
faced by those who represent victims of clergy sexual misconduct and 
explores potential avenues to reconciling church doctrine with jus-
tice. 
II.   THEORIES OF CIVIL LIABILITY 
 Over the last few years, allegations of clergy sexual misconduct 
have been asserted in greater numbers, and it has become increas-
ingly common for plaintiffs to sue religious organizations for their 
clerics’ misconduct. Not coincidentally, courts increasingly hold reli-
gious organizations liable for clerical torts. Theories of liability—
including imputed or direct negligence, breach of a fiduciary duty, re-
spondeat superior or agency, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, clergy malpractice, and negligent hiring, supervision, and re-
tention—have been received by the courts with varying degrees of 
success. A sampling of these causes of action is discussed below. 
A.   Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
 Some state courts have recognized a cause of action against the 
Church for breach of fiduciary duty with respect to sexual miscon-
duct of clergy.26 To recognize this cause of action, a court must first 
find the presence of a fiduciary relationship between the Church hi-
erarchy and the victim of abuse. Under section 874 of the Second Re-
statement of Torts, “[a] fiduciary relation exists between two persons 
when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the 
benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation.”27 
                                                                                                                    
Over Celibacy as Factor is Rancorous, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 2002, at A1 (discussing in-
stances of clergy sexual abuse among a variety of religious institutions). 
 25. Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 365 (Fla. 2002); Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 377 
(Fla. 2002). 
 26. Examples of cases recognizing a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in-
clude Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 322 (Colo. 1993); Jones by Jones v. Trane, 
591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 931 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. 
1989) (holding that a priest may be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty if he abuses his 
role as a counselor); and Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988) (finding 
that a priest who commits sexual misconduct in his role as a marriage counselor can be 
held liable for breach of fiduciary duty).  Yet similar causes of action have been denied in 
Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese of Omaha, 508 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Neb. 1993) and Schmidt 
v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979). 
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Fiduciary relationships are “founded upon trust or confidence re-
posed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another.”28 While 
not every clergy-parishioner relationship is a fiduciary relationship, 
many give rise to fiduciary duties because of the parishioner’s de-
pendence on, and faith in, the Church.29 
 Florida courts are among the state courts that recognize a cause of 
action for breach of a fiduciary duty against a religious institution or 
members of the clergy,30 and a cleric “who commits a breach of his 
duty . . . is guilty of tortious conduct to the person for whom he 
should act.”31 Fiduciary duties may be the product of personal, moral, 
or social relations; “liability is not dependent solely upon an agree-
ment or contractual relation between the fiduciary and the benefici-
ary.”32 For example, the Florida Supreme Court has held that a 
church that promotes its clergy as qualified marriage counselors has 
a fiduciary duty to its “counselees,” despite the fact that most parish-
ioners do not contract with the Church prior to receipt of counsel-
ing.33 Because liability is based on factual distinctions rather than le-
gal distinctions, juries—not judges—decide: (1) whether a fiduciary 
relationship exists between the plaintiff-parishioner and the defen-
dant-clergy, and (2) whether the defendant breached his or her fidu-
ciary duty.34 Jury instructions that properly and simply define the 
characteristics of a fiduciary relationship are therefore essential. 
 In Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
agreed that the existence of a fiduciary relationship is a question of 
fact for the jury and held that the trial court had “properly instructed 
[the jury] on the requisite elements of a fiduciary relationship.”35 The 
trial court had asked jurors to evaluate the level of trust that the pa-
rishioner placed in the clergy-defendants; whether the trust was jus-
tified; whether the defendants knew or should have known that the 
parishioner relied on them to act in her best interest; whether the de-
fendants “invited, accepted, or acquiesced in” the parishioner’s trust; 
and whether the defendants attempted to protect the parishioner’s 
interests.36 The high court upheld the jury’s finding of a fiduciary re-
lationship and affirmed the trial court’s holding that the Diocese of 
Colorado and the defendant bishop breached their duties “to deal 
                                                                                                                    
 28. Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). 
 29. Moses, 863 P.2d at 322. 
 30. See, e.g., Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 376 (Fla. 2002); Shealey v. Masters, 821 
So. 2d 342, 345  (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Palafrugell Holdings, Inc. v. Cassel, 825 So. 2d 937, 
940  (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). 
 31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b (1979). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Evans, 814 So. 2d at 375. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 863 P.2d 310, 322 (Colo. 1993). 
 36. Id. at n.14. 
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‘with utmost good faith and solely for the benefit’ of the dependent 
party.”37 In reaching this conclusion, the court never addressed 
church doctrine nor relied on a layperson’s definition of reasonable-
ness. 
 Yet some courts have been unwilling to recognize this action for 
breach of fiduciary duty because the inquiry would present “constitu-
tional difficulties” in defining the standard of care for a clergyman.38 
In H.R.B. v. J.L.G., for example, the Missouri Court of Appeals iden-
tified a fiduciary relationship similar to the one discussed in Moses 
but refused to recognize a cause of action for breach of fiduciary du-
ties against the defendant priest, archbishop, and Church of the Im-
maculate Conception School and Parish.39 Although it conceded that 
the priest’s sexual misconduct was not motivated by religious beliefs, 
the court somehow concluded that an inquiry into the religious as-
pects of the relationship between the Church authorities and the 
plaintiff parishioner was constitutionally improper.40 
 Beyond the bond shared between a parent and child, it is difficult 
to imagine a more sacred relationship than the one shared by a faith-
ful parishioner and his or her church. Even the term “Father,” as 
used by members of the clergy, invites trust and lulls loyal followers 
into feeling safe. This relationship must be guarded at all costs, and 
the Church hierarchy should be liable for failing to protect it. 
B.   Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
 Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a relatively new 
cause of action that has slowly gained recognition in state courts. 
Perhaps one reason for this slow pace is the potential for abuse that 
haunts a cause of action based on emotional rather than physical in-
juries. Nevertheless, modern science has provided courts—and more 
importantly, juries—with greater understanding of the human mind. 
Americans have become sensitized to the reality of psychological 
trauma, and the judicial system has acknowledged that legitimate 
claims for mental suffering exist. 
 The Florida Supreme Court, for example, first recognized the tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress in 1985 in Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co. v. McCarson.41 Two years later, in Dependable Life 
Insurance Co. v. Harris, the court identified the four elements re-
                                                                                                                    
 37. Id. at 323 (quoting Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988)). 
 38. Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 39. 913 S.W.2d 92, 98-99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
 40. Id. at 99.  But see Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 376 (Fla. 2002) (holding that Doe’s 
breach of fiduciary duty claim was not barred by the First Amendment, as the court is not 
being called upon to interpret ecclesiastical doctrine, and the “claim is governed by neutral 
tort law principles of general application”). 
 41. 467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985). 
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quired to establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress: (1) the defendant must have engaged in the deliber-
ate or reckless infliction of mental suffering;42 (2) the conduct must 
be outrageous; (3) the conduct must have caused the emotional dis-
tress; and (4) the distress must be severe.43 In helping to define the 
terms “deliberate,” “reckless,” and “outrageous,” the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal explained that the defendant had to act with purpose 
or recklessness, meaning that the defendant knew or should have 
known that the alleged actions would cause severe distress, and the 
defendant’s behavior must have been conduct that any reasonable 
person would call indecent or intolerable.44 Combined, these elements 
form a high standard designed to safeguard against fraudulent 
claims and to reflect the evolution of public opinion. 
 In stating a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress against a religious institution, a plaintiff must allege active 
conduct by the Church that directly caused his or her severe distress; 
it is not enough to allege the sexual misconduct of a cleric.45 For ex-
ample, in Elders, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the 
trial court’s dismissal of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress against the Florida Conference, Saint John’s on the Lake 
United Methodist Church, and the District Superintendent of the 
Methodist Church.46 The court explained that “the plaintiffs’ allega-
tions boil[ed] down to a claim of negligent failure to supervise Pastor 
Rivers[, which was] legally insufficient to establish a claim” based on 
outrageous conduct.47 
 Few plaintiffs, if any, have been successful in imposing liability on 
a religious institution for the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress because it is difficult to prove that the Church caused the plain-
tiff’s distress by taking actions separate and distinct from the cleric’s 
sexual misconduct and to prove that the Church’s actions were “out-
                                                                                                                    
 42. See Williams v. City of Minneola, 619 So. 2d 983, 987 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) 
(“Gross negligence does not meet the standard for an award of punitive damages, . . . and, 
thus, certainly cannot meet the standard to establish the tort of outrageous and reckless 
conduct.”). But see Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. 1985) (recognizing a cause of 
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress under limited circumstances when there 
is “death or significant discernible physical injury, when caused by psychological trauma 
resulting from a negligent injury imposed upon a close family member within the sensory 
perception of the physically injured person”). 
 43. Dependable Life Ins. Co. v. Harris, 510 So. 2d 985, 986 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (cita-
tion omitted). 
 44. See Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683, 690-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); see 
also Metro. Life, 467 So. 2d at 278-79 (explaining that the conduct must be “so outrageous 
in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency”). 
 45. See Elders v. United Methodist Church, 793 So. 2d 1038, 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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rageous.” The Boston Globe’s investigative reporting on clergy sexual 
abuse educated the public about a scandal that 
seemed almost too horrible to be true. The reports showed that 
members of the Church hierarchy—including Cardinal Bernard F. 
Law of Boston, the most influential American Catholic prelate in 
the Vatican—were not only aware of the abuse but had gone to 
enormous lengths to hide the scandal from public view . . . . 
 Most shocking to everyday Catholics, and most damaging to the 
Church, was the incontrovertible evidence that Cardinal Law and 
other leaders of his archdiocese had engaged in such a massive 
cover-up. Rather than protect its most vulnerable members, the 
Church had been putting them in harm’s way.48 
 Unlike Elders, where allegations against the Church defendants 
were founded on the Church’s failure to act, the Boston Globe’s ac-
count of Cardinal Law’s behavior describes outrageous conduct, dis-
tinct from the sexual misconduct of Reverend Geoghan, that purpose-
fully and recklessly caused the severe distress experienced by hun-
dreds of victims of sexual abuse. These allegations would clearly 
state a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 
C.   Clergy Malpractice 
 The term malpractice refers to “a professional’s improper or im-
moral conduct done either intentionally or through carelessness or 
ignorance.”49 It is often used to denote a physician’s or lawyer’s “un-
skillful performance of duties resulting from such person’s profes-
sional relationship with patients or clients.”50 Unlike an intentional 
tort or ordinary negligence—which is actionable regardless of a per-
son’s profession—malpractice, by definition, is “the breach of a pro-
fessional duty unique to that profession.”51 Thus, while the Church 
may be liable for an intentional tort or ordinary negligence, most 
courts have not recognized clergy malpractice because it calls for set-
ting a standard for the duties of a clergyman.52 And while courts 
greatly disagree on whether claims for torts like negligent hiring are 
                                                                                                                    
 48. THE INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, supra note 14, at 3. 
 49. BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 303 (1996). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
 52. See, e.g., Dausch v. Ryske, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that the 
plaintiff’s claims could be heard under traditional professional negligence claims and de-
clining to recognize a cause of action for clergy malpractice); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 
P.2d 275, 285 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (“We do not recognize the claim of ‘clergy malprac-
tice.’”); Leary v. Geoghan, 2000 WL 1473579, at *2 (Mass. Super. 2000) (“[I]t is safe to say 
that there is no such thing as ‘clergy malpractice’ in Massachusetts, or most other places.”); 
Hester, 723 S.W.2d at 550 (“[M]inisterial malpractice is a tort not known in Missouri 
law.”); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ohio 1991) (“[T]here is no basis for recognizing 
[the] claim for clergy malpractice.”). 
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barred by the First Amendment, they seem to agree that the states, 
through their judicial systems, may not set such a standard.53 
 The court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s claim for clergy malpractice 
in Schmidt v. Bishop is typical.54 In Schmidt, Christine Schmidt 
claimed that Reverend Joseph Bishop, a pastor at the Rye Presbyte-
rian Church, sexually abused her under the auspices of providing 
family counseling when she was twelve years old.55 The court ac-
knowledged that the alleged facts stated a cause of action for battery, 
but then explained that Ms. Schmidt had to rely on alternative 
causes of action since the statute of limitations had run on her claim 
for an intentional tort-like battery.56 Malpractice was one of the 
many alternatives pleaded in the complaint. 
 According to the court, Ms. Schmidt “deliberately avoided assert-
ing that the case involve[d] clergy malpractice, but rather style[d] 
[the] claim artfully as one for malpractice by a ‘youth worker and 
counselor.’”57 One reason Ms. Schmidt attempted to fit her claim into 
the category of counselor malpractice may have been because the 
first and most cited case on clergy malpractice, Nally v. Grace Com-
munity Church of the Valley, left open the question of whether the 
First Amendment barred a claim of clergy malpractice for negligent 
counseling.58 Moreover, asserting a more established cause of action 
                                                                                                                    
 53. See Paul A. Clark, Malpractice After F.G. v. MacDonell and Sanders v. Casa View 
Baptist Church, 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 229, 230 (1998) (“Defining [standards for clergy 
malpractice] forces the court to investigate and review the skill, training, and standards 
required of clergy members in different religions, denominations, and sects.  Undertaking 
such a task causes courts to become heavily entangled in religious doctrine and practice.”). 
For further commentary on clergy malpractice and the First Amendment, see generally 
Ben Zion Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling?  A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN 
FERN. V. L. REV. 47 (1981); Samuel E. Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a 
New Theory, 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 163 (1981); C. Eric Funston, Comment, Made out of Whole 
Cloth?  A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 
507 (1983). 
 54. Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 55. Id. at 324. 
 56. Id. New York has not adopted an extended statute of limitations (“SOL”) for sex-
ual abuse or tolling provisions for delayed realization cases.  If the abuse is treated as an 
intentional tort, New York’s SOL is one year. N.Y. CIVIL PRAC. LAW § 215 (McKinney 
2002). An action based in negligence, rather than criminal conduct, has a SOL of three 
years. Id. § 214. Other states, like Florida and Massachusetts, have adopted the delayed 
discovery doctrine. See Herndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. 2000) (stating that 
the SOL does not begin to accrue until the victim is aware that the abuse occurred and 
that accrual avoids the seven-year statute of repose); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 4C 
(2000) (setting the SOL for sexual abuse of a minor at three years from the time of the al-
leged acts or “within three years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should 
have discovered that an emotional or psychological injury or condition was caused by said 
act”). 
 57. Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 326. 
 58. 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988) (addressing several claims by parents against a 
church and its pastors for the wrongful death of a son who committed suicide after counsel-
ing by the pastors). 
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for malpractice by a youth worker and counselor was not a complete 
stretch. Indeed, “[t]he duties of a clergyman most nearly approximate 
to an existent professional practice, and hence most accountable to 
minimum professional standards, . . . include that of spiritual coun-
seling.”59 The Missouri Court of Appeals, nevertheless, took the posi-
tion that despite Ms. Schmidt’s broad use of the term “malpractice,” 
the real issue had to be clergy malpractice; otherwise, by analogy, “a 
medical malpractice action against a surgeon might well be charac-
terized as one for ‘counseling malpractice,’ since surgeons often en-
gage in pre- and post-operative ‘counseling.’”60 After calling the horse 
a “horse,” so to speak, the court addressed the viability of clergy mal-
practice theories. 
 Typically, clergy malpractice claims have been denied either be-
cause they fail to allege distinct facts pertinent to the clergy-
parishioner relationship that are not already actionable,61 or because 
the court is concerned that the alleged conduct is within the purview 
of the First Amendment. In Schmidt, the court stated that “[i]t would 
be impossible for a court or jury to adjudicate a typical case of clergy 
malpractice, without first ascertaining whether the cleric . . . per-
formed within the level of expertise expected of a similar professional 
. . . .”62 To measure a cleric’s conduct, for example, the court would 
have to create a hypothetical, reasonably prudent priest, pastor, or 
bishop. And while it may be possible to find that reasonably prudent 
clerics resist sexually abusing children, the court worried that the 
next case would be less clear.63 Thus, the court found that an analysis 
dependent on professional standards within the Church violates the 
Supreme Court’s prohibition against excessive entanglement with re-
ligion.64 
D.   Respondeat Superior 
 Even if a court finds that the Church hierarchy, meaning the gov-
erning organization or officials responsible for the cleric’s employ-
ment within the Church, has committed no wrongs distinct from 
clergy misconduct, the Church may be held vicariously liable for its 
employee’s misconduct.65 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
an employer is held liable for the tortious or criminal acts of an em-
                                                                                                                    
 59. Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
 60. Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 326. 
 61. Hester, 723 S.W.2d at 551. 
 62. Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 327. 
 63. See id. at 327-28. 
 64. See id. at 328 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).  For further dis-
cussion on excessive entanglement, see Part III of this Comment. 
 65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 13, cmt. b (1999) (“Perhaps the most popu-
lar justification for vicarious liability is that the costs of an agent’s torts should be borne by 
the enterprise [and] that a financially responsible party will respond if damages occur.”). 
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ployee if the acts “were committed during the course of the employ-
ment and to further a purpose or interest, however excessive or mis-
guided, of the employer.”66 Most clergy sexual abuse cases that ad-
dress respondeat superior focus on whether the sexual misconduct 
was committed within the cleric’s scope of employment. 
 In defining scope of employment, Florida’s Third District Court of 
Appeal explained that: 
[a]n employee’s conduct is within the scope of his employment, 
where (1) the conduct is of the kind he was employed to perform, 
(2) the conduct occurs substantially within the time and space lim-
its authorized or required by the work to be performed, and (3) the 
conduct is activated at least in part by a purpose to serve the mas-
ter.67 
 Sexual assaults and batteries are generally held to be outside the 
scope of an employee’s employment, but an exception to the rule may 
be found where the tortfeasor used his or her employment to commit 
the tort.68 Notwithstanding the fact that allegations of a cleric’s sex-
ual misconduct often include situations where the cleric used his or 
her position in the Church to gain the trust of and access to a victim, 
most courts have been unwilling to apply this exception to clergy 
sexual abuse cases.69 
 In Byrd v. Faber, for example, the Supreme Court of Ohio ad-
dressed the viability of a claim against the Ohio Conference of Sev-
enth Day Adventists based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.70 
There the plaintiff claimed that her pastor forced her into a sexual 
relationship.71 The court held the doctrine inapplicable because the 
                                                                                                                    
 66. Iglesia Cristiana La Casa Del Señor, Inc. v. L.M., 783 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2001) (citation omitted). 
 67. Id. at 357. 
 68. Id.; Hennagan v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 467 So. 2d 748, 751 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (finding that it could not be said, as a matter of law, that a trooper’s 
sexual misconduct, which was committed under the guise of detaining a shoplifting sus-
pect, was not within the trooper’s scope of employment). 
 69. See, e.g., Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of L.A., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453, 
1461 (1986) (“It would defy every notion of logic and fairness to say that sexual activity be-
tween a priest and a parishioner is characteristic of the Archbishop of the Roman Catholic 
Church, [and the court cannot conclude that] the Archbishop ‘ratified’ the concupiscent 
acts of the priests.”); Elders v. United Methodist Church, 793 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2001) (“As a matter of common sense, having sexual relations with a counselee is not 
part of the job responsibilities of a minister.”); N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 998 
P.2d 592, 599 (Okla. 1999) (“Ministers should not molest children.  When they do, it is not 
a part of the minister’s duty nor customary within the business of the congregation.  
Rather than increasing membership, the conduct would assuredly result in persons spurn-
ing rather than accepting a faith condoning the abhorrent behavior.”); Pritzlaff v. Archdio-
cese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Wis. 1995) (affirming that the alleged sexual mis-
conduct of a priest “could not have been in the scope of his employment”). 
 70. 565 N.E.2d 584, 585 (Ohio 1991).  
 71. Id. 
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Adventists “did not hire [the pastor] to rape, seduce, or otherwise 
physically assault members of his congregation,” and the plaintiff did 
not allege that they “should reasonably have foreseen that [the pas-
tor] would behave in this manner toward his parishioners.”72 Simi-
larly, in Iglesia Cristiana La Casa Del Señor v. L.M., Florida’s Third 
District Court of Appeal refused to apply respondeat superior be-
cause the plaintiff failed to allege that the sexual misconduct took 
place on Church property, that the pastor’s behavior was motivated 
by a desire to serve the Church, or that the pastor had been counsel-
ing her on the day of the crime.73 
 Note what these cases do not hold. These cases leave open the 
prospect that the Church may, under some circumstances, be held vi-
cariously liable for the sexual misconduct of a cleric. These cases 
merely find that the allegations, as set forth in the individual com-
plaints, fail to support the theory of respondeat superior. A plaintiff-
parishioner may, on the other hand, be successful by proving the 
abuse took place on Church property, or that the cleric characterized 
his or her behavior as an act of God, or that the abuse took place un-
der the auspice of a counseling session. In addition to the causes of 
action already discussed in this Comment, the Church may be di-
rectly liable for the negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of its 
clergy. 
E.   Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention 
 While the doctrine of respondeat superior generally fails to sur-
vive the Church defendant’s motion to dismiss in a clergy sexual mis-
conduct case, religious institutions are often held liable for a cleric’s 
misconduct under the doctrines of negligent hiring, negligent super-
vision, and negligent retention (collectively referred to as “negligent 
hiring, supervision, and retention”).74 The theory of negligent hiring, 
supervision, and retention is similar to the doctrine of respondeat 
superior in that the employer is held liable for the employee’s con-
duct; but unlike respondeat superior, negligent hiring, supervision, 
and retention does not require a plaintiff to allege that the em-
ployee’s misconduct was within the scope of his or her employment.75 
Of course, this lowered hurdle does not mean that an employer is 
strictly liable for any acts committed by his or her employee, against 
any person and under any circumstances; limitations have developed 
                                                                                                                    
 72. Id. at 588. 
 73. Iglesia Cristiana La Casa Del Señor, Inc. v. L.M., 783 So. 2d 353, 357-58 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2001). 
 74. See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287 (Colo. 1988) (holding that although 
the priest’s acts did not create a basis for holding the diocese vicariously liable, the diocese 
may be directly liable for negligently supervising the priest). 
 75. Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). 
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on a case-by-case basis.76 As the Second Restatement of Torts ex-
plains: 
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control 
his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to 
prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conduct-
ing himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to 
them if (a) the servant (i) is upon the premises in possession of the 
master or upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his 
servant, or (ii) is using a chattel of the master, and (b) the master 
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control 
his servant, and (ii) knows or should know of the necessity and op-
portunity for exercising such control.77 
Under this definition, it seems that many religious institutions have 
a duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring, supervising, and retain-
ing members of the clergy because clerics often live on church prem-
ises; and unlike secular employers, the Church hierarchy exerts con-
trol over every aspect of its “employees’” lives. In fact, the Church’s 
blending of personal and professional lives is motivated, at least in 
part, by the Church’s desire to know its clergy, and this knowledge is 
a critical element of the tort. The court’s determination of when the 
Church knew or should have known of the cleric’s unfitness—in other 
words, the timing of the Church’s knowledge—determines whether 
the Church is liable for negligent hiring, negligent supervision, neg-
ligent retention, or any combination of the three. The tort is commit-
ted at the point in the employee’s tenure when the employer first had 
knowledge or constructive knowledge of foreseeable harm.78 
 Florida recognized a cause of action for negligent hiring, supervi-
sion, and retention in Mallory v. O’Neil.79 The Florida Supreme Court 
stated that an employer may be liable for negligence where he or she 
knowingly employed a dangerous person and knew or should have 
known that the person “was dangerous and incompetent and liable to 
do harm.”80 In establishing a prima facie case, a plaintiff must prove 
                                                                                                                    
 76. See Iglesia Cristiana La Casa Del Señor, 783 So. 2d at 358 (“For the Church to be 
held liable for negligent supervision, it must have had constructive or actual notice that 
[the defendant] was unfit to work as a pastor at the Church.”); Byrd, 565 N.E.2d 584, 590 
(raising the pleading standards for negligent hiring and holding that “the plaintiff must 
plead facts which indicate that the individual hired had a past history of criminal, tortious, 
or otherwise dangerous conduct about which the religious institution knew or could have 
discovered through reasonable investigation.”). 
 77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965). 
 78. Garcia, 492 So. 2d at 438.  Some courts refer to the cause of action as negligent 
hiring and employment.  See, e.g., Abbott v. Payne, 457 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); 
Petrik v. N.H. Ins. Co., 379 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).  Others use the term 
negligent hiring, training, and retention.  See, e.g., Tex. Scaggs, Inc. v. Joannides, 372 So. 
2d 985, 986 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). 
 79. 69 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1954). 
 80. Id. 
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that (1) the employer was required but failed to make an appropriate 
investigation of the employee; (2) an appropriate investigation would 
have revealed the unfitness of the employee for the particular duty to 
be performed or for employment in general; and (3) it was unreason-
able for the employer to hire the employee in light of the information 
he knew or should have known.81 These elements contribute to the 
broader notion of reasonable foreseeability and enable courts to 
evaluate an employer’s employment practices to determine whether 
the employer breached a duty of care. 
 Third party tort claims based on a religious institution’s negligent 
hiring, supervision, and retention of a member of its clergy are highly 
contentious because the inquiry requires a court to evaluate the rea-
sonableness of a Church’s employment decisions. The Church’s 
greatest defense against such claims is that the court’s investigation 
of a religious institution’s employment practices is barred by the 
First Amendment. Although the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that “the appointment [of clergy] is a canonical act, [and 
that] it is the function of the church authorities to determine what 
the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candi-
date possesses them,”82 it has not addressed whether the First 
Amendment bars a claim for negligent hiring, supervision and reten-
tion. 
III.   NEGLIGENT HIRING, SUPERVISION, AND RETENTION                                 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A.    Split of Authority 
 In seeking to hold a religious institution responsible for the sexual 
misconduct of a cleric and for the resulting injury to third parties, 
the tort of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention has emerged 
as one of the most viable theories of civil liability, and in light of the 
Boston Globe’s reports on Cardinal Law’s practice of protecting felo-
nious priests, it could be one of the most useful tools for holding the 
Church liable. But there is at least one problem: a split of authority. 
While: 
[s]ubstantial authority in both the state an federal courts con-
cludes that . . . the First Amendment is not violated by permitting 
the courts to adjudicate tort liability against a religious institu-
tion[,] . . . contrary authority . . . concludes that any tort claim 
against a religious institution founded on negligent hiring or su-
                                                                                                                    
 81. Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 362 (Fla. 2002) (citing Garcia, 492 So. 2d at 440). 
 82. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 7 (1929). 
972  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:957 
 
pervision . . . is barred because the adjudication of the tort dispute 
would necessarily . . . interfer[e] with its religious autonomy.83 
 The United States Supreme Court should explicitly hold that the 
First Amendment does not bar a claim for negligent hiring, supervi-
sion, and retention against a religious institution based on the sexual 
misconduct of its clergy. 
B.   Analysis Under the First Amendment 
 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”84 The Supreme Court 
has made the First Amendment applicable to the states through in-
corporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.85 Therefore, state tort 
law must avoid restraining the free exercise of religion. In applying 
the First Amendment to state and federal laws, courts have recog-
nized that the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause 
serve distinct purposes. 
C.   The Free Exercise Clause 
 The Free Exercise Clause—“Congress shall make no law . . . pro-
hibiting the free exercise” of religion86—guarantees, “first and fore-
most, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one 
desires.”87 Nevertheless, as the United States Supreme Court ex-
plained in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the First Amendment “embraces 
                                                                                                                    
 83. Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 358.  Compare Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that the First Amendment bars a claim of negligent hiring, super-
vision, and retention because the inquiry “might involve the Court in making sensitive 
judgments about the propriety of the Church Defendants’ supervision in light of their reli-
gious beliefs”), Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 445 (Me. 
1997) (holding that the First Amendment bars a claim of negligent supervision because 
“imposing a secular duty of supervision on the Church and enforcing that duty through 
civil liability would restrict its freedom to interact with its clergy”), and Pritzlaff v. Arch-
diocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1116 (1996) 
(concluding that the First Amendment bars a claim of negligent hiring or retention be-
cause the court would be required to interpret “church canons and internal church policies 
and practices”), with Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1431-32 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (finding 
that the First Amendment does not bar a negligent supervision claim because the tort is 
based on neutral principles of law), Isley v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1151 
(E.D. Mich. 1995) (concluding that the First Amendment does not bar a claim of negligent 
supervision because the court would not be required to interpret church doctrine), and 
Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320-21 (Colo. 1993) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not bar a claim for negligent hiring and supervision because analysis 
would “not require interpreting or weighing church doctrine and neutral principles of law 
can be applied”), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1137 (1994). 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 85. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000); Capitol Square 
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 757 (1995). 
 86. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 87. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
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two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is ab-
solute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct 
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.”88 Since 
the freedom to act according to one’s belief is not absolute, the court 
must first ask whether the regulated conduct is “rooted in religious 
belief.”89 Even if the behavior is religiously based, neutral laws of 
general application do not violate the First Amendment.90 But “[a] 
law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a com-
pelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to ad-
vance that interest”; the court will apply strict scrutiny to determine 
whether the law violates the First Amendment.91 Consequently, if 
the conduct being regulated is religiously based, the court must iden-
tify the law’s purpose and function. 
 The Supreme Court engaged in this neutral-law-of-general-
application inquiry in Employment Division v. Smith92 and Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.93 In Smith, the Court 
examined an Oregon statute that proscribed the use of controlled 
substances, including the religious use of peyote.94 The plaintiffs con-
ceded that the criminal law had not been designed to inhibit their re-
ligious practices and that it was constitutional as applied to the gen-
eral public.95 Astounded by this concession, the Court reminded the 
parties that it had “never held that an individual’s religious beliefs 
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting 
conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record 
of more than a century . . . contradicts that proposition.”96 Because 
the statute did not violate the First Amendment, Oregon could deny 
unemployment compensation to unemployed workers who had been 
discharged as a result of their religious drug use.97 
 Three years later, in Lukumi Babalu Aye, members of the Sante-
rian Church challenged the constitutionality of the City of Hialeah’s 
ban on the ritual sacrifice of animals.98 The Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that a neutral law of general applicability “need not be justi-
                                                                                                                    
 88. 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). 
 89. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
 90. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 
(1993); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 91. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531-32, 546. 
 92. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 93. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 94. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876. 
 95. See id. at 878. 
 96. Id. at 878-79; see, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979) (explaining that 
“[t]he neutral-principles approach cannot be said to ‘inhibit’ the free exercise of religion, 
any more than do other neutral provisions of state law governing the manner in which 
churches own property, hire employees or purchase goods”). 
 97. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
 98. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 535-36. 
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fied by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the in-
cidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice”; but a law 
that targets the practices of a particular religion and that selectively 
imposes burdens on religious conduct requires a compelling govern-
mental interest to support it.99 Accordingly, the Court initiated an 
inquiry to determine first, whether the ban on ritual animal sacrifice 
was neutral; second, whether the laws were of general application; 
and third, whether the laws were supported by a compelling govern-
mental interest and narrowly tailored to serve that interest.100 
 The Supreme Court found that although the texts of Hialeah’s or-
dinances were facially neutral, the legislative histories revealed that, 
in drafting the ordinances, the City had been improperly motivated 
by a desire to restrict the religious practices of Santeria.101 Second, 
the laws were not generally applied to all members of the public who 
were engaged in similar activities.102 For example, the ordinances 
outlawed the religious sacrifice of animals but not the nonreligious 
killing of animals by hunters and fishermen.103 Finally, having de-
termined that Hialeah’s ordinances were not neutral laws of general 
application, the court applied strict scrutiny and found that even if 
the government’s interests were compelling, the ordinances were not 
narrowly drawn to accomplish those interests; the laws were there-
fore unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.104 
 Unlike Hialeah’s ordinances, however, a cause of action for negli-
gent hiring, supervision and retention does not violate the Free Ex-
ercise Clause. While it may be conceded, arguendo, that the Church’s 
employment decisions constitute religious conduct,105 common law 
torts are analogous to Oregon’s outlawing of controlled substances in 
that they are neutral laws of general application and are therefore 
enforceable against a religious organization. As the court explained 
in Smith v. O’Connell, “[i]t is easy to envision the kinds of ‘anomalies’ 
that could result from such an absolutist interpretation of the free 
exercise clause. For example, laws prohibiting murder would have no 
                                                                                                                    
 99. Id. at 531-34 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 887-89) (“Neutrality and general applica-
bility are interrelated, and, as becomes apparent in [Lukumi Babalu Aye], failure to satisfy 
one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.”). 
 100. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531-34.  
 101. See id. at 534-36. 
 102. Id. at 545-46. 
 103. See id. at 545. 
 104. Id. at 546 (finding that “all four ordinances are overbroad or underinclusive in 
substantial respects” and that “interests could be achieved by narrower ordinances that 
burdened religion to a far lesser degree”). 
 105. In Malicki, the Church Defendants never alleged that their employment decisions 
were guided by religious doctrine, and the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the Free 
Exercise Clause had not been implicated.  See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360-361 (Fla. 
2002). 
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application to human sacrifices performed pursuant to some religious 
practice.”106 Likewise, the compelling need to protect both adult and 
minor parishioners from clergy sexual misconduct, and to prevent 
the Church’s sustained efforts to hide or ignore that misconduct, 
meets the requirements of the court’s strict scrutiny. For these rea-
sons, the Supreme Court should find that negligent hiring, supervi-
sion and retention, as applied to a religious institution, is constitu-
tional under the Free Exercise Clause. 
D.   The Establishment Clause 
 The second component of the First Amendment, the Establish-
ment Clause, states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”107 This mandate for the separation of 
church and state, a cornerstone of American democracy, prevents 
both state and federal governments from enacting laws that “aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”108 Sev-
eral tests have emerged to guide the courts’ analysis of alleged viola-
tions of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.109 For in-
stance, in addressing constitutional issues that arise within the scope 
of public education, the court has applied the Lemon test set forth in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman,110 the “endorsement” test, which was first ar-
ticulated by Justice O’Connor and later adopted by a majority of the 
Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,111 and the “coercion” test, 
which was born out of the Court’s decision in Lee v. Weisman.112 
 While courts are free to apply any or all of the three tests, and to 
invalidate statutes that fail any one of them,113 First Amendment 
analysis of third party tort claims against a religious institution most 
often begins with a discussion of the Lemon test.114 In Lemon, the 
Court established a three-part test to determine whether a neutral 
law violates the Establishment Clause: (1) the legislation must have 
a secular purpose; (2) the legislation must not have the primary ef-
                                                                                                                    
 106. Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80 (D.R.I. 1997). 
 107. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 108. Abbington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) (quoting Everson v. Bd. 
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)). 
 109. See Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 606-07 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 110. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 111. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 112. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 113. See Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310-16 (2000) (applying all 
three tests to invalidate a school district’s practice of permitting student-led prayers at 
high school football games). 
 114. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussing the 
third prong of Lemon); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Wis. 1997) (explaining the 
three-part test established in Lemon). 
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fect of advancing or inhibiting religion; and (3) the legislation must 
not promote an excessive government entanglement with religion.115 
 While the Supreme Court designed the Lemon test to bring 
greater uniformity to First Amendment analysis, the test—
particularly in the 1990s—has been neither consistently applied nor 
formally overturned. For example, subsequent cases have used the 
third prong, excessive entanglement, as a factor in considering the 
primary effect of the law.116 Other cases have been decided on the ba-
sis of either of the first two prongs, and the courts have failed to ad-
dress the excessive entanglement prong altogether.117 
 Despite this trend to devalue the third prong, the few cases that 
have applied Establishment Clause analysis to holding a religious 
organization liable for the tortious conduct of its clergy have by-
passed the first two prongs of the Lemon test and have focused on the 
opportunity for the State to become excessively entangled in the 
Church’s employment practices.118 
 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin took this approach in Pritzlaff 
and found that the parishioner’s claims were barred by the First 
Amendment.119 Alleging that Father John Donovan used his position 
as a priest to coerce her into a sexual relationship with him, Ms. Ju-
dith Pritzlaff sued the Archdiocese of Milwaukee for negligent hiring, 
training, and supervision.120 Although the court found that Ms. 
Pritzlaff’s claims were time barred, it proceeded with its analysis un-
der the assumption that a cause of action for negligent hiring or re-
tention existed in Wisconsin at the time of the alleged relationship.121 
                                                                                                                    
 115. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
 116. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) (“[I]t is simplest to recognize 
why entanglement is significant and treat it . . . as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s 
effect.”); Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F. Supp. 2d 290, 297 (D.N.J. 1998) (“The Court essentially 
collapsed the Lemon test.”); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dept., 728 A.2d 127, 141 (“[T]he effect 
and entanglement prongs must be seen as parts of a unitary consideration.”). 
 117. See Newdow, 292 F.3d at 611 (refusing to examine the second and third prongs of 
the Lemon test because it had been determined that the 1954 Act, which inserts the words 
“under God” into the Pledge of Allegiance, violated the first prong and was therefore un-
constitutional). 
 118. See Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 81 (D.R.I. 1997) (holding that “it is 
unlikely that exercising jurisdiction over [a tort action against the Church] will result in 
any ‘excessive entanglement’ between church and state”); Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 328 (“It 
may be argued that it requires no excessive entanglement with religion to decide that rea-
sonably prudent clergy of any sect do not molest children.”); L.L.N., 563 N.W.2d at 440 (“It 
is well-settled that excessive governmental entanglement with religion will occur if a court 
is required to interpret church law, policies, or practices.”). 
 119. Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Wis. 1995). 
 120. See id. at 782-84. 
 121. See id. at 789 (citing In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992) (al-
lowing a moot issue to be decided where it is likely to arise again and should be resolved by 
the court to avoid uncertainty)).  The Pritzlaff court shifted from a discussion on “negligent 
hiring, training and supervision” to an analysis of “negligent hiring or retention” without 
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According to the court, “Ms. Pritzlaff would have to establish that the 
Archdiocese was negligent in hiring or retaining [Father] Donovan 
because he was incompetent or otherwise unfit”; but the First 
Amendment barred the court from setting standards for competent 
priests.122 
 The court applied the third prong of the Lemon test, though not 
explicitly, and expressed its concerns that inquiry into a Church’s 
hiring practices would improperly entangle the court in Church poli-
cies and practices since “traditional denominations each have their 
own intricate principles of governance, as to which the state has no 
right of visitation.”123 The majority seems to have been influenced by 
a law review article that rhetorically asked: 
If negligent selection of a potential pedophile for the religious office 
of priest, minister or rabbi is a tort as to future child victims, will 
civil courts also hear Title VII challenges by the non-selected 
seminarian against the theological seminary that declines to or-
dain a plaintiff into ministry because of his psychological profile?124 
Had the justices been able to envision a situation where the Church 
knew that a seminarian was a pedophile but hired him anyway and 
continued to put children in his charge, perhaps their answer would 
have been different;125 instead, they insisted that “[a]ny award of 
damages would have a chilling effect leading indirectly to state con-
trol over the future conduct of affairs of a religious denomination, a 
result violative [sic] of the text and history of the establishment 
clause.”126 Fearing entanglement, the court granted the Church de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss.127 
 The Wisconsin Supreme Court revisited this issue one year later 
in L.L.N. v. Clauder, where an adult patient became sexually in-
volved with a priest who had counseled her while serving as a hospi-
tal chaplain; the patient later brought a claim for negligent supervi-
                                                                                                                    
explanation; apparently, the court is assuming that these causes of action are synonymous. 
See id. at 789-90. 
 122. Id. at 790. 
 123. Id. at 791 (quoting Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 332). 
 124. Id. at 790 (quoting James T. O’Reilly & Joaan M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Miscon-
duct: Confronting the Difficult Constitutional & Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 31, 48 (1994)). 
 125. See, e.g., Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 75 (D.R.I. 1997) (alleging that the 
Church “knew that the priests were pedophiles and not only failed to take appropriate pre-
ventative action, but also actively concealed the priests’ sexual misconduct”). 
 126. Pritzlaff, 533 N.W.2d at 791 (quoting Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991)).  But see Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ohio 1991) (asserting that 
“even the most liberal construction of the First Amendment will not protect a religious or-
ganization’s decision to hire someone who it knows is likely to commit criminal or tortious 
acts”). 
 127. Pritzlaff, 533 N.W.2d at 791-92. 
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sion against the diocese that assigned the priest to the hospital.128 
The court discussed its decision in Pritzlaff and reasserted its belief 
that secular remedies could offend church doctrine.129 As the court 
explained, 
The reconciliation and counseling of the errant clergy person in-
volves more than a civil employer’s file reprimand or three day 
suspension without pay for misconduct. Mercy and forgiveness of 
sin may be concepts familiar to bankers but they have no place in 
the discipline of bank tellers. For clergy, they are interwoven in 
the institution’s norms and practices . . . . Therefore, due to this 
strong belief in redemption, a bishop may determine that a way-
ward priest can be sufficiently reprimanded through counseling 
and prayer. If a court was asked to review such conduct to deter-
mine whether the bishop should have taken some other action, the 
court would directly entangle itself in the religious doctrines of 
faith, responsibility, and obedience.130 
Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Church defendants.131 
 The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s reasoning in Pritzlaff and L.L.N. 
is flawed. First, the court seems to have been skeptical of the facts al-
leged in each case and consequently held little sympathy for the 
adult plaintiffs. In Pritzlaff, the court noted that Ms. Pritzlaff 
claimed, twenty-seven years after her initial experience with Father 
Donovan, that “the sexual relationship was ‘without her consent’ and 
was a result of ‘force and coerc[ion].’”132 Then the court quipped: “Of 
course, she must allege this as fact because a consensual sexual rela-
tionship between two adults is no longer actionable in Wisconsin.”133 
In L.L.N., the court’s skepticism rings in its statement that the “un-
disputed facts demonstrate that Clauder, a single man, engaged in a 
consensual sexual relationship with an adult, single, female.”134 One 
can only wonder if the cases would have been decided differently if 
                                                                                                                    
 128. 563 N.W.2d 434, 436-42 (Wis. 1997). 
 129. See id. at 441. 
 130. See id. (quoting O’Reilly & Strasser, supra note 124, at 45-46); see also Natal v. 
Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1576-77 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that the 
Free Exercise Clause prohibits clergy members from maintaining wrongful termination ac-
tions against the Church).  But see Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin., United Methodist 
Church v. Cal. Superior Court., 439 U.S. 1369, 1373 (stating that First Amendment con-
cerns “are not applicable to purely secular disputes between third parties and a particular 
defendant, albeit a religious affiliated organization, in which fraud, breach of contract, and 
statutory violations are alleged”); Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 581 A.2d 
900, 908 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (disagreeing with Natal and finding that a court 
has jurisdiction to determine whether a religious organization followed its own procedural 
rules). 
 131. See L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d at 444-45. 
 132. Pritzlaff, 533 N.W.2d at 786. 
 133. Id. 
 134. L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d at 443. 
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the plaintiffs had been children or even adults with stronger allega-
tions. 
 Second, the court’s opinions are flawed because they focus on pun-
ishment rather than prevention. Recall that the Second Restatement 
of Torts defines an employer’s duty under the tort of negligent hiring, 
supervision, and retention as a duty “to exercise reasonable care so to 
control his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment 
as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so con-
ducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm.”135 
This duty requires a religious organization to prevent foreseeable 
harm; it does not mandate a particular path of punishment. While it 
is true that the First Amendment prohibits state intervention in in-
ternal church disputes that concern religious matters and require in-
terpretation of religious doctrine,136 the duty to prevent harm is con-
sistent with church doctrine; the limits canon law places on the 
Church’s authority to discipline (redemption and forgiveness) are ir-
relevant in determining whether the Church acted to prevent harm. 
Thus, the court may avoid interpreting ecclesiastical law. Enforcing 
this duty will entangle the courts in no religious policies, and a cause 
of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention passes the 
Establishment Clause tests. 
IV.   MALICKI V. DOE AND DOE V. EVANS 
 On March 14, 2002, the Florida Supreme Court contributed to the 
national dialogue on the relationship between clergy sexual abuse 
cases and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution by 
issuing two opinions, Malicki v. Doe137 and Doe v. Evans.138 These 
cases were factually similar, although Malicki included the abuse of 
a minor, and both cases required the courts to expressly construe the 
First Amendment.139 Despite factual similarities and identical law, 
                                                                                                                    
 135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965) (emphasis added). 
 136. This principle is referred to as the “religious autonomy doctrine.” As the Supreme 
Court explained in Milivojevich, “civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the high-
est judiciaries of a religious organization . . . on [internal] matters of discipline, faith, in-
ternal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.” Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for 
the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976). The religious autonomy doctrine 
is most often asserted by the Church defendants in cases where a cleric is challenging dis-
ciplinary actions taken against him, see Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance 878 F.2d 
1575, 1576-77 (1st Cir. 1989); Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986), or in cases concerning disagreements among divisions of a 
Church over Church property, see Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue 
Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of 
Russ. Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
 137. 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002). 
 138. 814 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2002). 
 139. See Doe v. Malicki, 771 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 
286 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). 
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the decisions made by the Third and Fourth District Courts of Ap-
peal contradicted each other. The Florida Supreme Court’s March 14 
opinions represent a first step in ending the dispute. 
 In Malicki, a minor and an adult parishioner claimed that Father 
Jan Malicki sexually assaulted them on several occasions on the 
premises of St. David Catholic Church, and they jointly sued Father 
Malicki, St. David Catholic Church, and the Archdiocese of Miami 
(the latter two defendants are referred to collectively as the “Church 
Defendants”) on eight counts.140 The first two counts set forth claims 
of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention against the Church 
Defendants based on Father Malicki’s sexual misconduct and the 
Church’s failure “’to make inquiries into Malicki’s background, quali-
fications, reputation, work history, and/or criminal history prior to 
employing him in the capacity of Associate Pastor.’”141 Reaching for 
their shield, the Church Defendants claimed that the court’s inquiry 
was barred by the First Amendment because it would “’involve the 
internal ecclesiastical decisions of the Roman Catholic Church re-
quired by Canon Law,’” and they moved to dismiss the complaint.142 
 The trial court agreed that the First Amendment barred review of 
the Church’s employment practices and, prior to addressing the ve-
racity of the plaintiffs’ factual allegations, granted the Church De-
fendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice.143 On appeal, the Third 
District explained that its review was grounded in tort law and not 
religious doctrine, and went on to consider whether the Church De-
fendants knew or should have known about Father Malicki’s sexual 
misconduct and whether they failed to protect the parishioners from 
reasonable harm.144 In this manner, the Third District held that the 
First Amendment tolerates a claim for negligent hiring and supervi-
sion.145 
 In Doe v. Evans, a female parishioner filed a claim against the 
Reverend William Evans, the Church of the Holy Redeemer, Inc., the 
Diocese of Southeast Florida, Inc., and Bishop Calvin Schofield, Jr. 
(the latter three defendants are referred to collectively as the 
“Church Defendants”), consisting of several counts, including negli-
gent hiring and supervision.146 The parishioner alleged that Reverend 
                                                                                                                    
 140. Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 352. 
 141. Id. (quoting the Complaint jointly filed by the minor and adult parishioners). 
 142. Id. at 353 (quoting the Church Defendants’ motion to dismiss); see Serbian E. Or-
thodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14 (1976) (explaining 
that civil courts have no jurisdiction over “purely ecclesiastical” disputes concerning sub-
jects such as “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the 
conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them”). 
 143. Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 353. 
 144. Malicki, 771 So. 2d at 548. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 371-72 (Fla. 2002). 
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Evans initiated a counseling relationship with her and sexually ex-
ploited the difficulties she was having in her marriage.147 She also 
claimed that although the Church Defendants had actual knowledge 
of prior incidents where Evans had become sexually involved with 
parishioners he had intended to counsel, and although the Church 
Defendants “had the right to exercise control over” Evans, they did 
nothing “to rectify the situation.”148 Finally, the parishioner alleged 
that the Church Defendants’ actions, or more precisely their inac-
tions, were not religiously motivated.149 Arguing that the First 
Amendment barred the parishioner’s claim for negligent hiring and 
supervision, the Church Defendants moved to dismiss.150 
 The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirmed.151 The court found that the First 
Amendment barred the negligent hiring and supervision claims but 
asserted that a more compelling state interest, such as protecting a 
child from sexual abuse, may have forced a different outcome.152 The 
parishioner appealed. 
 Although the Florida Supreme Court decided Malicki v. Doe and 
Doe v. Evans separately, the opinions were issued on the same day, 
and the court expressly recognized that the outcome of Malicki con-
trolled Evans.153 In fact, the court dedicated an entire section of the 
Malicki opinion to a summary of the facts and issues presented in 
Evans.154 Thus, a review of the court’s decision in Malicki also serves 
to explain the court’s analysis of Evans.155 
 After an extensive discussion on First Amendment analysis in 
general, the Florida Supreme Court examined the factual allegations 
in Malicki under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the 
                                                                                                                    
 147. Id. at 372. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 287 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). 
 152. Id. at 289-90.  The Fourth District explained: 
[W]e are persuaded that just as the State may prevent a church from offering 
human sacrifices, it may protect its children against injuries caused by pedo-
philes by authorizing civil damages against a church that knowingly . . . creates 
a situation in which such injuries are likely to occur.  We recognize that the 
State’s interest must be compelling indeed in order to interfere in the church’s 
selection, training and assignment of its clerics. We would draw the line at 
criminal conduct. 
Id. at 289 (emphasis omitted). 
 153. Evans, 814 So. 2d at 371 (“For the reasons expressed in [Malicki], we hold that 
the First Amendment does not provide a shield behind which a church may avoid liability 
for harm caused to a third party arising from the alleged sexual misconduct by one of its 
clergy members.”). 
 154. See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 359-60 (Fla. 2002). 
 155. But see Evans, 814 So. 2d at 382 (Harding, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority quashes 
the lower court’s decision in this case on the basis of a questionable extension of Malicki.”). 
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First Amendment and determined that the Church is not immune 
from a tort claim of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.156 
The court first noted that the allegations set forth in the complaint—
namely that the Church Defendants were negligent in failing to re-
search Malicki’s character and in allowing Malicki to supervise the 
parishioners when the Church Defendants “either knew or should 
have known that Malicki had the propensity to commit sexual as-
saults and molestations”—closely paralleled the “classic elements” of 
negligent hiring and negligent supervision claims.157 Justice Pariente 
distinguished claims for negligent hiring, supervision and retention 
from claims for illegal hiring or discharge of a minister: claims based 
on negligence turn on the reasonable foreseeability of the cleric’s 
misconduct and not on the religious institution’s reasons for hiring or 
firing the cleric.158 Since the question of foreseeability does not impli-
cate religious doctrine, the court found judicial scrutiny consistent 
with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.159 Nor does 
the application of tort law to a religious institution by a secular court 
implicate the Establishment Clause. As the court explained, “impos-
ing tort liability based on the allegations of the complaint neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion.”160 Because the court found that judicial 
review of the parishioners’ negligence claims does not run afoul of 
the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses, it explicitly disapproved 
the Fourth District’s compelling state interest requirement.161 
 But Malicki does not end the discussion on the First Amendment’s 
control over tort claims against a religious institution in the state of 
Florida. In the third to the last sentence of its opinion, the Florida 
Supreme Court qualified its decision. The court restricted its holding 
to a statement that: 
[T]he First Amendment cannot be used at the initial pleading stage 
to shut the courthouse door on a plaintiff’s claims, which are 
founded on a religious institution’s alleged negligence arising from 
the institution’s failure to prevent harm resulting from one of its 
                                                                                                                    
 156. See Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 357 (“Although an entanglement inquiry is associated 
with the adjudication of an Establishment Clause claim, the extent to which the courts will 
be called upon to determine matters of church practice also implicates the Free Exercise 
Clause.”). 
 157. Id. at 362. 
 158. See id. at 363 (“[T]he court does not inquire into the employer’s broad reasons for 
choosing this particular employee for the position, but instead looks to whether the specific 
danger which ultimately manifested itself could have reasonably been foreseen at the time 
of hiring.”) (quoting Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1132-33 (Colo. 1996)). 
 159. Id. at 363-64. 
 160. Id. at 364. 
 161. See id. (“[W]e reject the distinction that the Fourth District drew in Evans, 718 
So. 2d at 289-90, that would apparently allow a negligent supervision claim against a 
[C]hurch defendant only if the underlying sexual misconduct involved criminal activity . . . 
.”). 
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clergy who sexually assaults and batters a minor or adult parish-
ioner.162 
The court’s qualification is important because the standard of review 
at the pleading stage is more relaxed. A court must assume that all 
facts alleged in the complaint are true, draw all reasonable infer-
ences favorable to the plaintiff, and decide the issues on questions of 
law only.163 Thus, Malicki and Evans leave open the First Amend-
ment’s role at later stages of the trial process, and it is unclear 
whether the Church will be able to lift its shield to avoid liability in 
the future.164 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Beyond First Amendment concerns, litigation against the Church 
is fraught with political considerations.165 Attorneys representing vic-
tims of clergy abuse are mindful of the line between aggressive advo-
cacy and an attack on religion.166 One attorney confessed that he ini-
                                                                                                                    
 162. Id. at 365 (emphasis added). 
 163. Connolly v. Sebeco, Inc., 89 So. 2d 482, 484 (Fla. 1956). 
 164. For example, several courts have held that certain document discovery requests 
create First Amendment problems. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 
31-34 (1984) (protecting information regarding the identity of contributors to and members 
of a religious foundation); Baldwin v. Comm’r, 648 F.2d 483, 488 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding 
that compliance with discovery requests would infringe on a religious organization’s free-
dom of association). For a general discussion on First Amendment issues in relation to dis-
covery requests, see Nicholas P. Cafardi, Discovering the Secret Archives: Evidentiary 
Privileges for Church Records, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 95 (1993/1994); Jeffrey Hunter Moon, 
Protection Against the Discovery or Disclosure of Church Documents and Records, 39 CATH. 
LAW. 27 (1999).  
 165. For example, most attorneys have been reluctant to file charges under the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), despite its potential for treble 
damages, for fear of labeling Church officials as “gangsters.”  See Associated Press, Law-
suits, Prosecutions Take Legal Matters Out of Church’s Hands, at http://www.cnn.com.law 
(last visited May 27, 2002) (“Charges for [Church] superiors could include violation of state 
laws requiring reporting of suspected child abuse or broader charges of . . . racketeering.”); 
Adam Liptak, Flush Times for Legal Vanguard in Priest Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 
2002, at A14; Dirk Olin, The Confessional, AM. LAW., June 2002, at 81 available at 
http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/media/2002/confessional.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) (“A 
broad-based, scattergun attack on the church itself would be a disservice to the good works 
the institution provides.”). But see Bob Van Voris, RICO a Long Shot in Church Sex-Abuse 
Case, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 1, 2002, available at www.law.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2002) (dis-
cussing Minnesota lawyer Jeffrey Anderson’s decision to file RICO claims against a group 
of Catholic bishops and the hurdles he will face in bringing the case). 
 166. While these cases, at least from the victim’s perspective, are seldom about money, 
settlement agreements and awards for compensatory and punitive damages threaten to 
bankrupt individual dioceses.  See Stephen Kurkjian & Michael Rezendes, Bankruptcy Fil-
ing Called Option for Archdiocese, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2002, at A1: 
The bankruptcy option is also being considered at a time when the archdiocese 
is grappling with a fiscal crisis . . . and a downturn in the economy that have 
forced church officials to cut this year’s operating budget by as much as 40 per-
cent, affecting urban parishes, parochial schools, and other church programs. 
See also Olin, supra note 165, at 83 (“[M]any archdioceses’ insurance policies are tapped 
out or insufficient to cover the potential liabilities . . . .  [T]he country’s 194 dioceses are le-
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tially had difficulty believing that he was “not suing God.”167 Another 
attorney found it easier to make a distinction “between the faith and 
the men who are a part of the faith. Men make mistakes, they can be 
corrupted, they can be criminal.”168 Media coverage has helped to de-
fine the line through increased public awareness of Church policies 
and practices.169 As victims share their stories, calls for reform grow 
stronger. 
A.   Mandatory Reporting and Clergy Privilege 
 Although all states have adopted mandatory reporting laws that 
require childcare workers to report incidents of known or suspected 
child abuse to local officials, most states excuse members of the 
clergy as mandatory reporters.170 In Florida, for example, mandatory 
reporters include physicians, health care professionals, school teach-
ers, and social workers, but not members of the clergy.171 In fact, al-
though the Florida legislature recently amended Section 39.204, 
Florida Statutes, which abrogates certain privileged communications 
in cases involving child abuse, the amended statute maintains the 
penitent priest privilege.172 Other states have responded to the clergy 
sexual abuse scandal more swiftly. On May 3, 2002, Massachusetts 
Governor Jane Swift signed legislation requiring clergy members to 
report allegations of child sex abuse.173 The law requires priests, rab-
                                                                                                                    
gally autonomous entities, reducing the likelihood of cross-jurisdictional exposure, but 
even [a] conservative estimate of payouts . . . comes to more than $300 million.”). But see 
Charles M. Sennott, Money Concerns Said Not Utmost, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 22, 2002, at 
A13 (“Most Vatican specialists insist that money is not the main issue, and the devastating 
financial ramifications of the scandals in the American archdioceses will actually have lit-
tle impact on the Vatican’s finances.”).  For articles on the financial cost of defending clergy 
sexual abuse cases, see generally http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/cost/ (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2003).  Moreover, accusations made against a member of the clergy often 
lead to divisions within the Church’s congregation. See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, An Ousted 
Priest, His Offense Long Past, Wistfully Departs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2002, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/01/national/01PRIE.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2003). 
 167. Bayles, supra note 17 (quoting attorney Darrell Papillon of Baton Rouge). 
 168. Olin, supra note 165, at 80 (quoting Cesar Alvarez, CEO of Greenberg, Traurig). 
 169. For complete coverage of the Church scandal in Boston, see 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2003); Belluck, supra 
note 17 (recognizing “the extraordinary public interest” in Cardinal Law’s deposition). 
 170. See Ruth Cornell, The Church and The Law in the Ninth Circuit Concerning 
Mandatory Reporting of Sexual Abuse: What the Legal Advocate Representing a Church or 
Clergy Needs to Know About Ninth Circuit Child Sexual Abuse Reporting Statutes, 1 J. 
LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 137, 138 (1999); Lisa M. Smith, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Manda-
tory Child Abuse Reporting Statutes May Encourage the Catholic Church to Report Priests 
Who Molest Children, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 409, 413-20 (1994). 
 171. FLA. STAT. § 39.201 (2002). 
 172. See 2002 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 174 (West) (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.204(3)); FLA. 
STAT. § 39.201 (“The privileged quality of communication . . . except that between . . . clergy 
and person . . . does not apply to any situation involving known or suspected abuse . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 173. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West 2002). 
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bis, ordained ministers, and other leaders of religious bodies to report 
incidents of abuse to state officials within thirty days of discovery.174 
 All states should follow Massachusetts’s lead and, if necessary, 
amend their mandatory reporting laws to include members of the 
clergy. The decision to report sexual abuse must be taken out of the 
hands of Church officials, who have a conflict of interest when it 
comes to reporting clergy sexual misconduct. Ironically, the Archdio-
cese of Boston failed to notify proper authorities of the heinous 
crimes committed by members of its clergy because the Church hier-
archy wanted to protect the priesthood and avoid scandal within the 
Church. Mandatory reporting laws, furthermore, eliminate First 
Amendment issues, making it easier to hold the Church responsible 
for its failure to protect children from known pedophiles. Mandatory 
reporting laws are neutral laws of general application, and a deter-
mination of whether the Church neglected to report known or sus-
pected incidents of child abuse will not require inquiry into church 
doctrine. Finally, mandatory reporting laws are designed to protect 
children who are silenced by sexual predators or who are unable to 
speak for themselves. Spiritual counselors, like teachers or health 
care workers, must provide those children with a voice. 
1.   Reconciliation and Waiver of the Shield 
 After The Boston Globe’s Spotlight Team reported on the Boston 
Archdiocese’s protection of Reverend John J. Geoghan in January 
2002, the world waited, and waited, for official word from the Vati-
can. Almost three months later, Pope John Paul II responded in the 
form of his annual pre-Easter letter.175 The Pope showed great con-
cern for the world’s priests, stating that “as priests we are personally 
and profoundly afflicted by the sins of some of our brothers who have 
betrayed the grace of Ordination in succumbing even to the most 
grievous forms of the [mystery of evil] at work in the world.”176 But 
his empathy for victims of abuse was limited to a brief appeal to 
Catholics to “commit” to Christ “[a]s the Church shows her concern 
for the victims and strives to respond in truth and justice to each of 
these painful situations.”177 The Pope avoided words like “clergy sex-
ual abuse” or “pedophilia,” and critics wondered whether he under-
stood the full extent of the American crisis.178 
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 In contrast, some of America’s Catholic leaders have expressed 
great remorse for the Church’s improprieties; their willingness to 
deal openly with clergy sexual abuse offers hope for reform. In a let-
ter published in The Miami Herald, Archbishop John C. Favalora 
recognized that: 
[t]he sexual abuse of children and young people by some priests 
and bishops has caused great pain, anger and confusion, and these 
feelings have been compounded by the inadequate ways in which 
some Catholic Church leaders have dealt with these terrible acts . . 
. . [He expressed] great sorrow and regret . . . for the suffering of 
victims of sexual abuse, their families and [the] Catholic commu-
nity.179 
 Beyond showing sympathy, Bishop Wilton Gregory, President of 
the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, encouraged priests who 
have engaged in sexual misconduct to “[r]eport this fact so that jus-
tice and the Church will be served, and [the priest] will be able to live 
honestly with [his] own conscience.”180 Confession and repentance, an 
integral part of the Christian faith, should also serve as cornerstones 
of the Church’s legal defense. 
 If the Church genuinely wishes to respond “in truth and justice,” 
then it must waive its right to assert the First Amendment as a 
shield to liability. It is unethical to preach confession and repentance 
in a house of God while practicing denial in a court of law. It is time 
for the Church to set down its shield. This is not war. Like the mo-
ment when King Henry II kneeled before Becket’s casket, this is the 
time to repent. 
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